Summary

Sonny Vanderbeck, co-founder of Satori Capital, shares his journey as an entrepreneur and the lessons he learned from selling and buying back his company. He emphasizes the importance of being a good owner and caring about the long-term success of the business. Sonny discusses the due diligence process and the need to focus on what you have to believe about the company and its future. He also talks about the challenges of merging with another company and the importance of defending your organization from unnecessary changes. In this conversation, Sunny Vanderbeck discusses multiple capital, the importance of size and stability in businesses, and the different asset classes his company invests in. He also talks about the need for a clear investment criteria and the challenges of finding deal flow. The conversation touches on topics such as the role of debt in business, the impact of the internet on consumer behavior, and the importance of being a good partner to portfolio companies. Sunny shares a story about a CEO who closed a deal with another company without informing them, highlighting the importance of ethics in business.

Takeaways

Being a good owner means caring about the long-term success of the business and making decisions that benefit all stakeholders.
Due diligence is a crucial part of the acquisition process, and it's important to focus on what you have to believe about the company and its future.
Merging with another company can provide growth opportunities, but it's essential to defend your organization from unnecessary changes.
Building infrastructure and strong leadership are key to scaling a business beyond a certain point.
Investors are more likely to believe in you as an entrepreneur if they have seen you operate and trust your abilities. Multiple capital is important in understanding the value of a business, but predicting the future is difficult.
Size tends to imply more stability and reliability in earnings.
Debt is a tool that can be useful in the right circumstances.
Having a clear investment criteria helps in finding the right opportunities.
Being a good partner to portfolio companies is crucial for success.
Ethics and trust are important in business relationships.

 

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Transcript

jon (00:01.882)
Well, welcome to the social... Well, welcome to the show, Sonny. How are ya?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (00:06.99)
I'm doing great. Thanks for having me.

jon (00:09.274)
Sonny, I wanted to start asking you a few questions about your journey here. You are Army Ranger. Thanks for your service. And then you started data return. Did you start that or did you take it over? What was the deal on?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (00:15.822)
That's right.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (00:26.414)
I did. So the co -founders and I were at Microsoft in the early nineties or mid nineties, I guess. And some of the work we were doing was related to the internet. And we had this crazy idea that people were going to buy stuff on their computer and that the internet was going to matter a lot for business. It sounded like crazy talk at the time, but it turned out it worked. Yeah. Yeah. So I actually, I sold it a couple of times. So the journey went a little bit like this.

jon (00:48.09)
came true and you sold that.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (00:56.174)
I almost had it sold to the perfect buyer who was also an investor. That deal didn't happen because they merged with another company. As you know, time kills deals, pace matters a lot. So I had another buyer, so we sold it in... And we were a public company at the time, so we grew a bunch, took it public. So first time we sold it was in January of 2002. We sold it to the wrong buyer.

jon (01:09.082)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (01:24.75)
We were not a great fit for the buyer. Within a year, they filed for chapter 11 and we got to buy our profitable company back. So that was cool. You might assume that. Yeah. And, and so that, that was kind of wild, like going from, you know, public company to being a corporate guy. Like one of the things I learned in that do I'm not a corporate guy at all. Like I'm an entrepreneur. Like you tell me to fill out an expense report. We're going to have a problem.

jon (01:34.106)
For pennies on a dollar, let's say. Yeah.

jon (01:55.674)
I'm not a corporate guy either. I remember I got seen in the Intuit and I got put in a cubicle next to a person and another person came in and she started putting up all these fuzzy bears at the stop. And I go, nah, that's just, I'm out. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (02:07.598)
I'm done. Yeah, I'm out. So I would occasionally rewatch office space to kind of make myself feel a little bit better. But yeah, that was kind of a wild ride. So yeah, I got to buy it back. But even that process was kind of rough. They wouldn't let me bid on it directly. I wasn't allowed to go to the courtroom because they were worried I was going to, you know, chill the process. And so I got to sit at home and wait for 28 hours. It was at the time was one of the longest auctions ever.

as they were auctioning my life's work out on the courthouse steps and maybe a competitor was going to buy it and tear it apart or maybe a financial partner was going to buy it and we were going to get a go at round two. So we got to go around too.

jon (02:50.97)
Yeah. So was there other lots of other buyers at the auction? yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (02:54.506)
yeah, yeah, there's a bunch of people chasing after it.

jon (02:58.234)
Was there a emotional part of the decision to go with you versus somebody else that was offering more or less or?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (03:06.894)
No, like that was the whole thing because it was inside this chapter 11 process. In that process, like no one cared. So it was just people just slugging it out. Like no one cared about me.

jon (03:20.378)
There was no attachment to the cell or anything. It was just a bankruptcy judge going, you should go this way. Yeah, yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (03:26.062)
That's right. Yeah. So I just got to sit around and like literally the next day I was going to wake up and I got my company back and I got a shot at round two. Or like I didn't have a job and they were going to disassemble it for part. That was not a fun day. I don't recommend it for anyone.

jon (03:40.858)
Yeah.

jon (03:44.41)
yeah. Did you stay up all 28 hours? Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (03:47.722)
yeah, yeah, there's no way I could do this. Like I tried to sleep, you know, like four o 'clock. I'm like, do you have to get some sleep? You got to be on tomorrow. And there was just no way it was going to happen. You know, no one thought it was going to go that long either. They'd never seen anything go, cause it wasn't just my business. So this, the idea behind the company was a cool idea. They were basically taking all these tech companies that had overlap and putting them all together. So you could go to a customer and say, look, we can do everything end to end. So it was a great idea. It just didn't work.

jon (03:57.85)
Yeah.

jon (04:15.45)
Yeah, yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (04:16.75)
It was a weird time. It was post -9 -11 and a bunch of stuff. Anyway, so there were a lot of peace parts. So no one had ever seen an auction that long. Everybody thought, a couple of hours, you're in, you're out. It was comically complicated and it ended up somewhere. This wasn't happening in Dallas or New York City or LA. This was like a small town in Maine. Long story about why it happened there, but that system was not ready for this level of complexity.

So anyway, man, Hero's Journey, like I wake up, we got it back, it's profitable, we get to go for it. So that was fun.

jon (04:53.274)
Yeah. by the way, I love that book, Joseph Campbell, Here with a Thousand Faces. Yeah. You got it back. What did it look like? Was it, you know, a lot of dust on it, not doing anything, or is it in shambles or what do they do?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (05:05.678)
Yeah, so I stayed on. I was there the whole time. So it's kind of funny because we all just, most of my team had stayed on too. So when they acquired us, we ran as a separate business unit. They had a similar business. We sort of acquired that into our company. So we all just opened our drawers and took out our business cards from a year ago because it was only a year. We are like, I don't know, 15 months. We took out our old business cards and got back after it. Now there was a bunch of stuff to fix.

It's shocking how fast you can break a bunch of stuff that used to work. So it took us about 18 months to use your metaphor, you know, knocking all the dust off and we had to rebuild finance and HR and sales and stuff like that. But it was fun and I think we were back with a vengeance because at this point we got something to prove, you know.

jon (05:58.65)
Yeah. And you were with partners. How many partners did you have?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (06:02.51)
I had two co -founders.

jon (06:04.57)
Yeah, and they were all in themselves. All in, yeah. Were they in the military too, or just a...

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (06:07.022)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (06:13.966)
Yeah, no, the tech military overlap in the mid 90s was like zero. It was basically zero. Yeah. So I...

jon (06:18.938)
pretty, I was going to say pretty scarce probably. Yeah. Now you see it so much more, man. You see it in politics and you see it in tech. Big. Yeah. And.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (06:29.262)
Yeah. Yeah, but at the time, no. So they were, one guy I had known, or CTO I had known before Microsoft and another one, Michelle, I met at Microsoft. And so, yeah, we just started this crazy thing in the spare room of my house. And it was a fun ride. The whole thing was a fun ride.

jon (06:49.818)
Yeah, and you grow back and then you sell it again a second time. And who did you, was everybody goes like, hey, we're done with this ride. Or did you have somebody come in and go, I'd like to buy your company?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (06:55.534)
That's right.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (07:03.374)
Yeah, it was the timing seemed to make sense. And I won't go too far into this because it had to do with the sort of shape of the industry, but the punch line was this. So we had the highest end product in our market, but there was a substitute product that was another way to solve the same problem. So it wasn't really a competitive product. And what we found was a lot of the customers we would go to, they wanted to buy high end product, but they wanted a different flavor of it that we didn't do.

Like, so the other guys did like very focused on do it yourself data center kind of stuff. And we were like, look, hand us the keys. If you're H and R block, you got six days a year where you make all your money because it's online tax filing. Big, it's complex. It has to work. So basically the idea was, look, if we get acquired by one of the companies that does the same quality of service, but through a different way, like data center focus, do it yourselfers, we could accelerate the growth rate of the combined business. And that's, that's what happened.

The businesses were a great fit together. Most of my team stayed on for another five years. So it was, you know, it's part of the learning and part of the input for the book was like watching, like, what does a not great acquisition look like? And what does a great one look like in that one? I think our customers got a better outcome because of the acquisition. The majority of our employees got a better outcome because of the acquisition. Like my, my CMO.

And my sales executives ended up being the global CMO and global sales execs for the combined business. Didn't take them but a year. So we saw a lot of like promotion opportunity and things like that. And so I think it got a good outcome for a lot of the stakeholders. And that's kind of become one of the big inputs to the book was watching like, how does this go when you care about people around you and you can get them a good outcome too, when you do an acquisition?

jon (09:00.602)
Yeah. Did you kind of like, I want to ask you a question about the kind of false for four reinforcement, but you already had one episode of what not to do. Now you, cause like, like Warren Buffett talks about, you know, the, the way we do that is just to avoid the dragons, right? That was a dragon. Now you're in a good spot. How cautious were you about saying, Hey, this is not overlapped. Isn't there, I'm going to kill the business. They're not going to, you know, this is.

going to be a good fit because it can do that. But sometimes we create these sandcastles and start doing this false reinforcements.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (09:36.366)
Yeah, I would say in, in this case, we were, aware of the problem, but probably not great at knowing exactly what to do about it. So sort of unconsciously competent, maybe it's like, we got a better outcome. We, we certainly had had a bad one before, but it wasn't like we had a clear rubric of here's how we're going to think about it and here are the questions we're going to ask. And here's a checklist. It was more to your point of like,

Hey, this is what a dragon looks like. Don't do that again. and an example on the, on the dragon front, like we did a lot more reverse diligence. Like that was one of the things we failed to do the first time. Let's just big, you know, company that bought us the first time I had more than a billion of revenue, big business, bunch of rockstar people involved. So we kind of did light diligence. We made a bunch of assumptions. Round two, we didn't make a lot of assumptions. We got really clear.

on what they were up to and you're allowed to ask crazy questions like, why do you want to buy us? You can ask that question. You don't stress your back.

jon (10:41.786)
Yeah. Did you ask a lot of people in there because they may have different answers or was it one individual? Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (10:45.454)
yeah, we were always asking like, why do you, so it was, why do you want to buy us? What are you going to do with it? Like, so imagine you, you've got somebody who's thinking about buying your company and you're like, show me the org chart after the acquisition. So if you never asked the question, what's going to happen to my Salesforce, then it's, that's like, that's on you. If you ask the question, you're like, well, where does sales go? And they're like, well, we're going to move all of your salespeople to report to this person you've never met.

You're like, well, maybe I want to meet that person. Just so you can actually, it's okay to ask those questions.

jon (11:20.474)
And I bet you asked, where does my HR and accounting department go? Cause that's what you had to rebuild. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (11:25.646)
Yeah. Yeah. You ask a bunch of questions like that because you want to know what life is going to be like, post transaction. So here's what happens. Like part of the mindset is you get in deal mode and all your advisors around you, like they don't care about the day.

jon (11:41.914)
They just move, there's momentum behind it. He's like, just shuffle that under the rug. Just keep moving forward.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (11:47.822)
That's right. And all they care about is getting to closing day. Problem is, as owner or CEO, like you have to care about what happens after a closing day. So nobody else in the room is going to care about this stuff, but you. And so it's like on, it's on you to care. you know, what are you going to do with it? How's HR going to work? Like one of the things I talk about in my book, there's a guy down in Austin that had an insurance business and part of the way they made their, you know,

thing work was they were way more casual. Like particularly at the time, the insurance business was pretty conservative world. Like you went to work in a coat and tie. That's kind of not the Austin vibe at all. and so one of the things they did different that helped them get great talent was like, Hey, we're not playing that game, like dress appropriately, but you don't have to wear a tie to work. Wouldn't you know it? He sold his business two weeks later as people show up from corporate and they're like, Hey,

We're from HR. We're here to help. It's come to our attention that you must be unaware of our company's dress code." And they started rolling out the coat and tie on him. And all he had to do, by the way, like you can ask for this stuff. All he had to do was say, hey, this dress code thing's kind of important. Like, are we going to, we can keep our existing dress code going forward. Yeah. Or, or at least like some of this stuff, I'm not sure a dress code I would.

jon (13:03.706)
And do you write that into the contract? Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (13:12.238)
try to put that in the contract. It's just a conversation with the CEO. Like, hey man, don't do this, this is important to us. Some things go in the contract. The dress code wouldn't be a borderline, you gotta like pick your battles of what lawyers are gonna fight over.

jon (13:28.57)
Yeah, but it's also like you have a conversation with a CEO and he tells you, yeah, don't worry about it. You guys can dress appropriately casual. And then if he goes back on his word, you go, I can't trust that guy. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (13:31.95)
Yeah.

So what really?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (13:40.91)
So what really happens like practically the CEO of a big business is not thinking about your dress code. They don't care. And so it's not that they go back on their word. It's that the, the Borg like there's the big organization, somebody in HR sees a post somewhere and they're like, why aren't they wearing a tie? And somebody else in HR is like, get down there and get them in line. And then they go down there and you're like, Hey, no, we had a deal with the CEO. We're not playing that game. And if you have a problem with it, you should call the CEO.

jon (13:47.034)
Yeah

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (14:11.278)
and then they leave you alone.

jon (14:14.81)
Yeah, welcome to corporate.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (14:16.366)
Right. That's the, you know, and some of the stuff like, look, if you get acquired in your state, you stay on often part of your job is to find the things corporate has that are amazing and leverage them and find the things corporate has that are ridiculous and defend your business from them. Like it's never perfect. It's not, you know, you can't expect perfect, but you goofy stuff like that. You just defend the organization from it. And.

He got access to a bunch of new products and a bunch of new sales channels and your job is to go figure out how to unlock those and get them moving.

jon (14:50.042)
Yeah. So did you write this book selling without selling out 2019 kind of a on the cusp of selling out your business and did you always have the intention to be going to private equity Satori capital?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (15:04.302)
Yeah, so the first time we sold it was 2007. And I, or sorry, second time, first time was 2002, second time was 2007. So I had had lunch with a guy named Randy Eisenman, who turned out to be the co -founder at Satori, every week for three or four years. Business dating, we were both CEOs. We didn't really have an objective, we just knew we liked each other.

jon (15:28.73)
Yeah. Conversation flowed real well. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (15:31.086)
Yeah. And we got to complaining as entrepreneurs do. Like if you don't know that entrepreneurs complain, you don't know entrepreneurs. We complain a lot. Here's the thing though. Wow. That's correct. Now you get it. Like, so you complain, but eventually you go, wait a minute, let's stop complaining and go fix it. And so the genesis of Satori was, can we build the capital partner we wish we would have? Like what, what would that look like?

jon (15:40.666)
Well, there's a purpose behind the complaining because you're looking for an opportunity to make money. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (16:00.398)
And we got to talking about it and got to talking about it and we got a real clear sense of it. And so that was the Genesis for Satori to say, let's go be like, can we make awesome? Can we be amazing? And we'll never be perfect. And I know that, but we can always try to be better. And that's really like, can I be a little bit better every day at being a good partner for the companies in which we invest? And so, and now imagine this, like we're going to get in the time machine for a little bit. It's 2008, 2009.

the world's melting down, we're in the middle of a global financial crisis. People are buying gold and they're talking about the US dollar is going to go away. And here come these two, you know, I don't know, mid 30 year olds saying, we're going to change the face of private equity, but we need, and we're going to care a lot about stuff like culture and stakeholders. And we need capital where we'd never have to sell. Please give us money to go do this.

jon (16:33.53)
700 drop and yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (16:59.342)
Like the world was, they just kind of laughed at it. Yeah. So they thought we were a little crazy to care about this kind of stuff. And they definitely thought we were crazy about the idea of an indefinite holding period. So you had to want it really bad because the first three or four years were real slow on the capital front. But then as things go, we started to just show people like, here's how it works. Our first investment we made.

jon (16:59.898)
Nice! Yeah, nice, but how am I gonna make money?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (17:25.646)
was a 50 year old multi -generational family business. They wouldn't have transacted with just plain old private equity, but we were different. They met us and they're like, you're like us, like you're CEOs. You care about the long -term. You care about what we're trying to do for our people, those kinds of things. And so we got to make an investment that no one else got to look at. And so...

jon (17:48.09)
What kind of business was that? You don't have to tell me the name because it doesn't look like you broadcast the names on your site. So yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (17:53.934)
Yeah. Yeah. So, it was, towers for the electric grid. So we're making these, you know, a hundred, 150 foot tall, monopole towers with two inch wide welds, sort of engineering driven business that, if you got it wrong, a pole fell over and a city goes dark. So it was a really neat business.

jon (18:12.346)
Yeah.

jon (18:15.77)
Yeah. And how big a business was that? Now your thesis on the front, your buy box was $5 million to $25 million. Did that change over time or was that always been?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (18:25.678)
Yeah, so I think we started around three to 15 of Ibidda and I would say today it's five to 50.

jon (18:29.978)
Yeah.

jon (18:34.138)
What did you learn about that moving up a little bit more?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (18:37.966)
Yeah. So, so here's what we learned. the journey from three to five, isn't a straight line. So somewhere along that way, and sometimes it comes on at two and it can go till six, but here's the point. There's a point in the business that would you've got to start building some infrastructure that the, a hero running around with a bunch of, you know, individual contributors, you can build a business that does two and a half million of EBITDA, three million of EBITDA doing that kind of stuff.

but it requires day -to -day heroism to do it. And the next stage of the business is you start to build infrastructure where you've got leaders that can actually get results without you. And so for context, by the way, that first business, I think it was 60, 70 million we invested and probably 220 when we exited.

jon (19:31.13)
Yeah. So you exited, but you were looking for money from investors that you're going to hold forever. What?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (19:37.838)
Yeah, so I'll make an important distinction between I can think about it like I'm an owner and I'm going to hold it forever. So one thing is I'm deciding about the future, even though I don't know what the future holds. The other one is I just have all the options. I'm not trying to flip it like it's a house. You see house flippers on TV. Yeah, like be a good owner. So sometimes good owners hold for a really long time.

jon (19:45.85)
Yeah, which.

jon (19:56.186)
Okay, yeah, that's a distinction and just, yeah, the way you're thinking about it.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (20:04.622)
Sometimes you see a situation. So I'll give you an example of, and here's what usually happens in our portfolio. Our co -owners and the leadership team of the business come to us and say, look, here's what we see going on in the market. And we think we should merge, exit, transact in some way. And here's why. Well, we're smart enough to know we're not smart enough to know when those times are, but our teams do. And so if the leadership team comes to us and says, hey, it's time to do something, we listen very carefully.

So in this case, our CEO had got to talking with another CEO in the industry and they figured out if they merged that they would be the new number two in the industry and they would get to work on a whole category of jobs that only two companies got the bid on. And so they looked at it and said, Hey, there's a soft spot right here. Cause only two companies can chase this work. If we can get big enough, we can chase it too. no, it was just the scale of what they were. Sometimes these power lines are.

jon (20:49.178)
Yeah.

jon (20:57.722)
Was that government jobs or just large? Okay.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (21:03.726)
100 mile long power lines a lot of poles And there so there were only two companies that could do a job that big So we said this sounds great like let's let's get into it and let's talk and it turns out the other company was also had investors And so the right path for it was for the other company to basically acquire ours now those guys So the CEO the the second gen

jon (21:06.874)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (21:31.086)
He was in his mid 60s, so he took the opportunity to go hang with his grandkids. And the generation behind them, I think they're still there seven years later.

jon (21:40.698)
Wow. Yeah. So let me rewind a little bit about this first investment in the Powerline construction company. Was this your money or was it investors money?

When did they first started believing you and go, Hey, we like this. We like your thesis the whole long, but Hey, there's a distinction in my thesis holding forever. It's not a Warren Buffett thing. It's a, you know, we don't know what the future holds distinction. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (22:02.574)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (22:08.814)
Yeah, it's just sort of be a good owner. There's a point at which I'm not the right person to own it and somebody else is, but I think that's true of most owners. Like they, there's a point at which they go, it's not time to own it, but they didn't think about flipping it. So the first capital, it was, we had, we were very fortunate. We had a lot of people that believed in us. They weren't sure about the thesis. And this was the interesting piece in the very early days.

These were not people that heard our thesis and went, that's amazing. This strategy is perfect and I'm going to invest in it. They went, we've seen these guys operate. We kind of know who they are. We're going to, we're going to believe in them, not so much their thesis. and so that was sort of the first investment and just as time went on and we were able to show what we were trying to do, it got easier and easier.

jon (23:01.082)
Yeah. Yeah. And this is before the big rush to be a private equity company and purchase all these other, you know, HVAC companies. Yeah. Yeah. And, and your second investment, well, tell me about the process of how you do, do, do diligence on these companies. Like how deep and what extra level and w at what point do you go, it's, it's a green light. It's a thumbs up and you get all three of your.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (23:09.038)
Right, right, yeah.

jon (23:30.874)
partners to say the same thing.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (23:34.254)
Yeah. So I would, I'll start here as a recipient of good due diligence. It's one of the hardest things you'll do in your life as a business owner, because you have to keep running the business and there's a lot of questions. And it actually give a talk about this, about how to do, how to do due diligence. If you're trying to make acquisitions. But this is not occasionally you'll read something in the news about somebody, you know, saw the financials for a company and then bought it.

Like that's not how this works. Like these are.

jon (24:07.034)
Yeah, I just read a story where this is an old story where Warren Buffett never met the owner, just sent him the financials, but it's a publicly traded company. So yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (24:15.918)
So it's, you know, look, that makes for a good story. But the next level of detail is it's a public company. You got a lot of detail. You make some assumptions about the business. We just got a billion of revenue and 150 million a year of profit. You don't have to worry about whether or not they have good cash controls. The company's got 70 million of revenue and no CFO. Who knows? Like it's just who knows. So I'm gonna...

jon (24:24.282)
It's PC UAV, the audit and all kinds of stuff. Yeah.

jon (24:36.89)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (24:45.902)
Describe this so there's a ton of what we call checklist due diligence Legal and financial and environmental and that stuff like you have to do it and you're just looking for for big risks that you couldn't find The important stuff is what we call. What do you have to believe? Like and it's just we try to get that down to three or four things of what do you have to believe about this company and the team and the future? To be it. Yes, and that keeps us focused because you can do do diligence forever

And I watch, I watch strategic's, the corporate buyers do this all the time. They'll start new diligence in a year later, they're still doing it. And so you got to learn how to tell them, no, like you can't, I had a buyer try to send like 20 people from HR to do an all day meeting with 20 people from the company. And we just had to tell them, we're like, look, I don't, I know you guys don't do this regularly for a living. What you've asked for is a post acquisition meeting.

jon (25:22.33)
It's the deal fatigue, yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (25:46.318)
So you're welcome to do that after it closes. No. So you can, you can say no. so, so we try to figure out like, what do you have to believe? Like, well, I have to believe that we can increase cross sell upsell over here, or I have to believe that the company has been able to open one school year for the last three years. And for the next three years, we're going to be able to keep opening one school year, or it's, it's things like that that are more sort of strategic level.

realities about the growth. Now to get to that answer, you've got a bunch of questions, but generally it's going to take 75 days worth of diligence and another 15 of shuttling legal documents around and getting ready to close and all that kind of stuff. It could go faster if you're super organized, but it's really hard to be organized enough to withstand an onslaught of questions. But part of my job,

jon (26:42.522)
Yeah. Are you?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (26:44.91)
On day one, I need to, and I use I here, I really mean this, my whole team. We need to understand the business good enough to be a good partner. Like if I show up on day one and I'm asking silly questions, I can't help. If I show up on day one and I understand who's the customer, why do they buy, how do we get to them, how do we build this product, all this other stuff, then I'm able to help.

jon (27:09.946)
Are you looking for a specific long -term hold forever kind of return on this? I was just finished Brad Jacob's book, what the hell is it? How to Make a Few Billion Dollars. He's always looking for a 5X return in any industry he goes into. He sees some kind of arbitrage.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (27:28.622)
Yeah, I would say in terms of multiple capital, you know, multiple capital only tells you a lot if you have the time dimension. So it's a sort of industry convention to use a five year time horizon to model and kind of figure it out. Look, it's find me somebody who can predict what the world is going to be like in five years, much less three or seven. Yeah, yeah.

jon (27:50.906)
Yeah, who would put the AI thing on change and everything and then data centers being and the energy required for data centers. I'll take it all of that. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (27:58.67)
That's right. So I would say generally 3X is kind of the target for our industry. Just by and large, if it was sort of 3X in five years, that's a solid thumbs up out.

jon (28:12.506)
Yeah. And you definitely got that on this electric pole company, would you say?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (28:16.494)
you know, unfortunately it's tough for me to talk about direct returns, just given that we're regulated. we were fortunate to have a great outcome on that because it helped people understand, what we were trying to do at Satori.

jon (28:21.242)
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay.

jon (28:31.514)
Yeah. What's your, I just curious about if, you know, Warren Buffett's on a video somewhere talking about the situation with supply and demand and private equity companies where they jump up the PE pyramid. You get any comment about that? Like you get to zero to 15 EBITDA 15 and 50, it jumps up a multiple five to nine. Is that what you're trying to do?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (28:55.758)
Yeah, it's you do see some of that. Look, it's bigger, more profitable businesses are not always, but likely to be more capable of producing repeatable, reliable results. And there's four. Yeah. I think it's less driven by the supply of capital and more driven by the reality.

jon (29:13.274)
and they're fewer of them and a lot of trillion dollars, five trillion chasing it.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (29:23.598)
So I'm going to give you a, I'm going to overdo the example to make the point. You've got one location where you rent forklifts and you make a million dollars a year. Like, and you think about all the things that could go wrong with that business, including, I don't know, they decide to repave the street. I've seen this happen. Like they decide to repave the street and no one can get there. So they go to the other forklift place. Like so many things could go wrong with that million of earnings.

jon (29:27.45)
Yeah, that's perfect.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (29:52.654)
And think about the infrastructure and ability to market and know your customer and all of the things that are reality. Now take a same version of that business, but I have a hundred locations and I do forklifts and cranes and backhoes and dah, dah. And it's a hundred million a year of profit. How much more stable is that second business? And the sort of practicality is size tends to imply some more reliability in the earnings and more stability.

jon (30:22.33)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (30:22.798)
Right? At a million of profit, there's one person that if they come out of the system, the business stops working at, at a hundred locations, you've figured out how to get repeatability and reliability at the store level. And you've got a regional VP level that manages those. And so you've got a business that can withstand getting kicked around more.

jon (30:44.954)
You've got these little unit level economics in all these hundred different places. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (30:47.054)
That's right. That's right. And so the Florida and Texas stores are doing as good as your Illinois stores are doing bad. Right. But if you only had one in Illinois right now, you're like, wow, the world looks really tough. You got one of these in Florida. You're like, life's great. So that there is a dimension of repeatability and reliability that tends to show up with size. And so that does create.

jon (31:00.026)
Yeah.

jon (31:07.162)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (31:17.23)
part of the difference in multiple pricing. Yeah, but it's very real. Like a company that's, you know, and again, I'm using the extremes to kind of make the point because the break points are a little different in every industry. If a million of EBITDA is worth three and a half times EBITDA, a hundred million of EBITDA is worth 13 and a half times. Like it's that big and it kind of goes along the way. And I will say though,

jon (31:20.762)
And those valuations, yeah.

jon (31:39.674)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (31:46.99)
For a lot of industries, 5 million of EBITDA is a very important breakpoint. Back to where we started in our conversation, because usually that's about where the capital can start to show up at any scale.

jon (31:51.994)
Yeah it is.

jon (32:00.058)
at cheaper prices too, right? I mean, I'm gonna give you an example. If I was gonna go buy an SBA, a SMB business with SBA, it's right like at 12 % because of the closing costs and everything else. You go to institutional money, it's six to 8 % some places. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (32:20.014)
That's right. Cost of capital changes, willingness to put different amounts of debt on it changes, which can be both good and bad. You know, I wrote an article about it was never say never. And it was about I know a bunch of people that say, well, I'll never take equity. Or and I know a bunch of people to say, well, I'll never take debt. And the point of the article is, hey, these are tools. It's just a tool. That's not good or bad inherently, because it's like salt. Like you ever had fries with no salt?

They're not great. Too much salt's pretty gross too. Debt's kind of like that. It's a tool. It's useful in the right circumstance and right situations.

jon (32:50.937)
Mmm, yeah, they don't taste that good, yeah.

jon (33:00.89)
I'm not gonna be able to get that out of my head now.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (33:03.374)
Good. That was the idea. You'll be thinking about that salt.

jon (33:08.698)
Yeah, too much salt, you're right, tastes nasty. And you can't improve it though. You can't get like a scrapey.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (33:14.126)
That's right. Well, that's the thing. Like it's hard to take debt off of a business. You can always do a little more. And in fact, that's one of the patterns we have. We often use not enough quote unquote debt, like compared to how our peers work in the early days, because we got a lot of work to do. Like we're trying to, how do we make this a better place to work, improve the culture, grow the, we got lots of stuff to do.

let's not get distracted by, well, the bank this and like, that's just not our thing. And after you've been a partner for a while and kind of things settle down, now you get a good sense for, okay, what's the right amount of salt on this?

jon (33:55.962)
Yeah. Let me ask you about your buy box, the type of industries and explain what acceleration, environmental and neuro. I get the environmental and neuro could be solar stuff, but what's the acceleration and where did that come from? What's your origin of that and why?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (34:11.022)
Yeah, so.

Yeah. So let me zoom out a little bit because this will be helpful. So we have a private equity business. We also have a platform of other funds that's sort of designed for families that like to own a lot of alternative assets like real estate and venture and things like that, hedge funds. And we've got a hedge fund that does a long, short trading in the environmental space. And then we've got a venture fund that does neurotechnology and clinical psychedelics.

jon (34:19.578)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (34:44.686)
So the context for here is in private equity, we're doing manufacturing, particularly where there's a lot of engineers running around or some intellectual property. Like one of our companies, their product cost a million dollars and it takes a year to build it. We like that stuff. We're good at that kind of environment where it's hard, it's complex, and there's a bunch of engineers.

jon (35:05.85)
And you can't get a lot of competitors coming in too easily. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (35:08.27)
But that's right. Cause it's hard. we do a good bit of, you know, industrial services, which we also call the white truck business. an example company there we had was machinery moving. So if you want to move the Silicon wafer machine inside of a chip fab, you can't call two guys in a truck. You call two guys in a truck, they're going to drop it and you can't make chips now. Like it's, so it's sort of, it's a, it's a service.

jon (35:31.866)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (35:36.334)
It's pretty technical, but it's not something you can go to school for. So you've got these amazing like skilled technicians that know how to do this kind of work. They get in a white truck and they go to the place and they do the thing. And then the last focus area are what we call classic consumer goods. So you've got a brand that's been around forever, but they're not good at the internet. There are still a bunch of brands that you and I know that are great and they sell through other stores.

but they're just not good at selling directly to us.

jon (36:06.618)
How do you find us?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (36:10.542)
So part of it is just looking around and watching what we see in the world. Part of it is just constantly telling people like, hey, if you see a classic brand, the brand's been around 20 years, everybody knows it, but their website's not very good and I can't buy it on Amazon and that kind of stuff, then call me. That's what we do.

jon (36:27.29)
Yeah, I guess that's the only way you plan it. It's like.

trying to think of something like that. That's going to be my head too. Cause that's a good business too. We, we got a, by the way, I, I just joined a couple of other veterans, and we started Patriot Growth Capital, kind of a me private equity fund to buy, companies and put veterans in the CEO role. So yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (36:37.006)
Good.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (36:50.894)
Awesome awesome. Yeah, I'll give you an example. Actually. I talked to a friend recently. This one wasn't for us It was this great apparel business had a like core loyal following But like 10 % of their revenue was from the internet Like hey, man, if you sell they have some of the coolest hats in the world Like he sent me some of them like this hat is amazing. It's a $30 hat But they just when he got there

He's like, they just weren't good at the internet. They sold through distributors and brokers and all that kind of stuff. And so they're out there. And it's...

jon (37:24.218)
Yeah.

jon (37:28.026)
Let me apply your what you have to believe to that because I've been in that situation before when I worked for Autodesk and we were 100 % a reseller channel at that point when I was there. And then the intercom comes along and we're a software company and go, yeah, we don't have to split this margin with you anymore.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (37:51.694)
And you know, you end up spending a lot, if not all of that margin on advertising, but you know.

jon (37:59.898)
Yeah, it shows up at a different expense item. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (38:03.022)
Yeah. So, so here's a couple of examples of what do you have to believe? this is the kind of product that people will go to a website to buy. Like you have to be willing to believe somebody will, will buy a hat off the internet. Like at this point I can get there on that. but like if the product doesn't cost much, you know, if your average basket size is going to be, you know, 15 or $20, you have to be careful because now you have to ship it. Like you get, there's all these things underneath this that, okay.

what's it gonna cost me to find a customer? If I get them, what's the basket size gonna look like relative to the shipping? Because everybody wants free shipping, although lots of people are starting to walk that back. So if it cost me $10 to ship a thing I sold for $20, how much did it cost me to make the product? If it cost me $80, right. So one of the what do you have to believes is practically does this.

jon (38:50.458)
Yeah, it starts at 50%. Yeah. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (39:00.11)
product in this consumer base or they're going to want to buy this thing directly on the internet? Can I put a big enough basket of stuff in front of them? Another important one is you can manage the panel conflict. Yeah.

jon (39:10.714)
But let me kind of take that a little bit farther because you don't own the business yet and you want to apply this theory. Will they do this for me to believe? What do I have to believe? How do you test that? I'll give you a perfect example. I tried to buy a company. It was a courses. It was a programming courses from Udemy. The guy was throwing off $2 million in cash. It was 90 % margin because Udemy was 100 %...

responsible for this. But I said, I want to buy you, but I want to test something first. And he said, okay, great. Take a course and do this and try to sell it independently. Couldn't do it. I couldn't create a funnel. Couldn't do it. Didn't make a dollar.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (39:55.054)
I'm glad you tested it. In a lot of, so most, mostly what we've seen, and again, because these are larger businesses, they do something. So there, it's not like their revenue is zero. It's just one of those, the website's not very good. It doesn't get any attention. Shipping's kind of slow. So you can look at this, this they're already doing it. And you say, well, here's an example. What's the basket size right now to get for these customers or.

jon (39:56.346)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (40:24.526)
If they're doing any advertising at all, like out of what do the economics look like on the advertising, things like that. Sometimes, so it's, it's usually not in this particular case that they're not doing it. It's that they're not taking it seriously enough. It needs an executive applied to it. Somebody thinking about it every day. Let me give you one other example. There was a company that we looked at the majority of their revenue was, was not digital.

They sold a little bit on Amazon and we're like, hey, can we see your data files from Amazon? And they sent them to us and we looked at them and they made $5 of revenue at an 80 % gross margin for every dollar they spent on marketing.

And we're like, hey,

Can y 'all do some more of this? Like we just had that kind of like, what are we missing? Like maybe we can do some more. And in their case, they're like, hey, we just don't trust the data.

jon (41:22.874)
Yeah, can you just put a little bit on the accelerator? Just a little bit more. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (41:31.854)
which is interesting because my view of it was, well, you could be wrong by half and now you're making 250 for every dollar you spend and that's okay too. So let's go. So it's often, but here's the problem. The digital stuff is a different mindset because it's different pacing. So a lot of businesses, like if you ship to distributors, like you have this month's shipments that are going out. And...

jon (41:39.994)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (41:59.662)
If you're shipping to individual consumers, today, it has to go out now, not even tomorrow. Like they ordered it today, get it in the box and on the truck right now. Well that.

jon (42:11.162)
Like Amazon, if I order from Amazon, like I can, I have a distribution here in Tucson near the airport. It's here same day. That's somebody thinking about how do I do this?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (42:17.806)
Yeah.

That's right. So that the mindset of, yeah, the shipments got to go out this month. And a plus or minus a day doesn't really matter to we have been trained as consumers. If we buy it on the Internet, we want it now. So if it takes me four days to get it in a box. It customers aren't happy, so it takes a different mindset around how you take risk on inventory, too. You have to really be able to think about, particularly if you have a longer supply chain.

jon (42:33.914)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (42:50.318)
where it might take six months to make a batch of the products. Well, how many of those am I gonna make? Because you don't know, like in your old world, you had an order from a customer. They want 10 ,000. Great, I'm gonna make 10 ,000. This one is I don't have any orders. I have to make inventory in advance of orders. So how do you think through that? How do you plan through that? How do you take, how do you learn how, so part of the digital game is learning how to take risk. Right, can I look at, as an example, a set of data and say, this data's good enough for me to try.

jon (43:21.05)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (43:21.582)
and I can try and I'll get a little more learning and I'll iterate very quickly. So that's a unique sort of skill set that usually requires additional people on the team.

jon (43:33.754)
Yeah, I was just thinking of an example. I remember in a book, business book, where a guy, when cable first came out, cable, the people would chase the cable guy down the road. That's like people, I don't have to run numbers there, right? I just want to buy more infrastructure for cable. But most of the time it's like this situation right here. Like I got to mitigate my risk because if I, this bet doesn't work, you know, I'm going to go back to doing what the old guy was doing.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (44:03.918)
Yes.

jon (44:07.13)
I gotta ask you about all these asset classes and these, this money types, the PE, you're buying companies, hedge fund, VC type stuff. How are you becoming so good at each one of these? And are you hiring different people in aspects or are you?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (44:24.494)
Yeah, so in each of these businesses, we have an extraordinary leader that leads that business. So as an example, in our neuro, like you look at me and I don't look like a clinical, you know, neuroscience guy. I'm not. Amy, on the other hand, has a PhD in neuroscience and has been in this space her whole life. She was at DARPA doing secret squirrel stuff on the brain. Now she's a professional investor in PhD. So, so my role there.

is can I create a container that helps drive towards success? And maybe I'll have unique insights on go -to -market, because go -to -market's a portable skill. Like how you figure out how I'm going to get this stuff into the hands of a customer is not the same between an industrial water treatment system and a clinical trial. But turns out a whole lot of these things, the parallels are pretty close.

jon (45:12.218)
No, there's clinical trials. Yeah, it's just...

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (45:21.006)
So I'm on the investment committee for each of our businesses. I spend the majority of my time in private equity because I think that's where I can add the most value and I'm on the board of all of our portfolio companies. But this is definitely not the Sonny and Randy show. And for context, we have about 40 people on the team.

jon (45:37.69)
Yeah. Yeah. And Deal Flow for you, what are your expectations for somebody finding Deal Flow, bringing you a deal, looking at deals and in your funnel? What does that look like for, and it's got to be a company that's 5 million to at minimum 25 million EBITDA.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (45:55.886)
Yeah, so we probably see a thousand for every two that we do.

jon (46:01.146)
Thousand for every two. Yeah

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (46:02.734)
Yeah. Now the number one cut, the first cut cuts in half is just the size issue. Like there are just more companies in the world at, you know, one or two or three of EBITDA than at 10 or 15 or whatever. Yeah. Sidebar, one of the things that we do that can be really helpful, most of our industry hates to make minority investments. Just the idea of it is entirely distasteful to them.

jon (46:16.762)
25. There's this like, yeah, it starts to really win away and out.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (46:32.238)
We like it. So we had one of our investments, we bought a third of a family owned business. There was some shareholder stuff going on and we bought out one of the shareholders. And so now we're a new partner with the family. And so when we do those, we'll go up to 50 of EBITDA in these larger businesses. We can be a minority investor. Yeah. So you end up with this sort of funnel of like, does it even fit our size? And then is it in an industry where we think we can be a good partner? Cause part of it, man, this is not.

Like the money stuff comes, if we can find good businesses and be good partners to them and help them be better versions of themselves and grow, like the money part shows up. The, did we make a difference? Were we a good friend and partner with the CEOs and owners? Like that's the fun part. The fun part is like when we're in it, like doing stuff. so one of the questions for us is not just like, is there an economic case here? But like, can we just be a good partner?

jon (47:22.01)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (47:31.278)
If we look at a thing and we're like, we don't know what to do with that. We just can't be a good partner. We're not going to invest in that. But what it means is we look at it's, it's like the opposite. You know, when you're CEO, most of the projects you work on when you're CEO, they're going to work. Occasionally you'll have something you're like, we tried to launch this product or do whatever and it didn't work, but most of it works. The funny inversion here is most of the companies we see don't fit. so it's, it's on us to just get better and better at.

being clear about what's a fit. And that's been a part of the learning journey for us is we started with the sort of entrepreneurs FOMO, the fear of missing out, which is kind of always an entrepreneur thing. And so my advice for any entrepreneur would be the tighter your aperture and the clearer you are about what you're trying to acquire, the faster you'll go, not the smaller. The fear that we'll...

Yeah, but what if there's a deal that doesn't fit this criteria that I like? That will leave you with a criteria that's so wide no one can explain what it is.

jon (48:40.954)
Yeah. And I agree with that because we're actually at that point with Patriot Growth Capital looking at deals, just looking at, I mean, not even our first acquisition. And I get that aperture part. I get that. Yeah. So.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (48:55.598)
Yeah. We spend a lot of time looking at things that might work.

jon (48:59.482)
And you try to fix them too. Like, we can fix that. Yeah. Yeah. Where are you at with, you know, like, let me ask you a different question. What's the weirdest deal and the weirdest no you've ever seen? Because a lot of that had to come from relationships. You want a good relationship and want a good partner.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (49:23.118)
Gosh, I'd have to think about the weirdest one. We've been at this 15 years. There's probably some really weird ones in there that I've tried to forget. I got one for you. It wasn't a no, but it was just one of those, like, how did this happen kind of moments. So we had a CEO we spent half a day with on a Friday and it wasn't a holiday weekend.

jon (49:30.33)
Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (49:49.422)
But it was like he showed up at noon for lunch and we, you know, from then until like five and he got on a plane and left and we're just talking about the business and you know, what was going on. We might be a good fit and all this kind of stuff. On Monday, we saw a press release that he closed the transaction with a strategic.

jon (50:08.666)
So there was no, he didn't let you know that we're, the ink's almost dry on this other deal.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (50:16.206)
It was probably under exclusivity anyway. Probably couldn't have been talking to us, but that's me. Like, and your thing's going to close on Monday and like, so are we just your, your backup plan? Like I, I was, it was unbelievable. Like I had a whole bunch of guys, myself included, spent a half a day, like trying to do the right thing, leaning in, figuring this thing out. And then on, it wasn't like a month later, he sold it on Monday. He sold it.

jon (50:20.698)
It shouldn't have been. Yeah. Yeah.

jon (50:44.41)
Yeah. So it was already signed. Everything was signed. Yeah. There's no way that it's probably unlikely that they ink the deal on a Saturday or Sunday. It was signed. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (50:46.286)
That's right. Yeah.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (50:53.294)
That's right. So that one was definitely lives in the weird bucket. You know, occasionally we'll see some product categories come by. We're like, yeah, we're just not doing that. Don't even care if it's a good business. Life's too short, not doing it. So.

jon (51:02.554)
Yeah.

jon (51:05.978)
Yeah. So did philosophically or did you ever check in on see how that deal's going? Cause that's kind of a little bit of a, like, you know, thorn in somebody's shoe going, yeah, I probably wouldn't do that. Is it likely that something in the future is going to not turn out to him from, because of his ethical lapse and judgment?

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (51:27.438)
Yeah, you know, he sold it to a strategic. So I think he flipped him the keys and moved on. So kind of he's gone and, you know, that's it. Look, and I'm I won't ascribe bad ethics to somebody when it could just be they just didn't know any better. Like, yeah, look, most CEOs don't spend any time thinking about the capital markets.

jon (51:34.842)
he's gone. Yeah, I got it.

jon (51:47.482)
Okay, you give me the benefit of the doubt.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (51:54.734)
and they don't spend any time thinking about deals. They're just running their business. And so there's this whole world, they just don't know anything about. And so they do things that you're like, how could you do that? No one does that. Like, well, who told them you can't do that? So I'm not really mad at the guy. I have a little bit of like, I probably wouldn't have made that decision. So yeah, I try to give people the benefit of the doubt and they just don't know versus they're sort of, they're bad actors kind of stuff.

jon (51:57.882)
Okay.

jon (52:24.634)
Yeah, gotcha. Yeah, because you know, they could have gone home and to their wife and says, you know, I kind of had this meeting with them I shouldn't have had. And he goes, hey, you got to let it go. We're going to just put 200 million in our bank. All right.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (52:34.374)
Right? Yeah, I figured out I'm a little happier when I live my life as an optimist So I'll just be an optimist about people and occasionally I'll get up get a whack because of that, but that's alright

jon (52:47.194)
Life's too short. Yeah. Sonny, thank you so much for spending time with me and tell me about your journey and your book, Selling Without Selling Out.

Sunny Vanderbeck (Satori) (52:56.814)
Yeah, happy to do it. And if anybody wants to get in touch with me, my website is sonnyvanderbeck .com. You can get the book there. And I got a couple of workbooks that help you work through the process of figuring out who you care about, what you want for them, and how to get it.

jon (53:11.834)
Thank you so much.

Let me stop this.